Strong debates in the varieties of capitalism literature as to whether financial liberalisation and internationalisation undermine 'insider' corporate governance systems based on patient capital in coordinated and state-led market economies have focused on 'impatient' overseas private capital. However, cross-border state investment has also grown. We examine government policies towards a prominent type of state investment-equity purchases by Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). We argue that policy makers in insider' corporate governance systems can see such investment as an attractive international source of patient capital to offset declines in traditional sources of patient capital. We compare Germany and France and show that policy makers actively welcome SWF investment. Policy is driven by coalitions of 'insiders' of the managements of large industrial firms and governments who seek passive patient capital and beneficial relationships with overseas investors. Thus financial liberalisation and internationalisation can allow new sources of patient capital through overseas state investors.
Introduction
Within wide-ranging debates about 'Varieties of Capitalism' (VoC), a key issue has been whether financial internationalisation and liberalisation undermine the supply of 'patient capital', which in coordinated market economies (CMEs) and mixed market economies (MMEs) has been a central element of 'insider' systems of corporate governance in which firms enjoy cooperative and close relationships with investors (O'Sullivan 2007 , Callaghan 2015 , Fioretos 2010 , Culpepper 2005 , Gospel, Pendleton, and Vitols 2014 , Goyer 2006 , Fichtner 2015 . The literature has focused on private overseas capital, which is treated as being 'impatient' and often threatening to established 'insiders'.
In contrast, we argue that not all overseas outsiders can be treated as a single category. In particular, much of the literature has neglected foreign state investors, which have become increasingly important in recent years. The most prominent are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013, Bolton, Samana, and Stiglitz 2012) , but others include public pension funds and state-owned enterprises. We examine how and why different types of 'insiders' in CMEs and MMEs respond to equity investments by SWFs-do they treat such overseas state investment as threatening existing corporate governance systems or accept them as new sources of capital? We study policy responses in France and Germany, as examples of an MME and CME. Both have had insider systems of corporate governance based on 'patient capital' and both have faced financial liberalisation and declines in traditional sources of domestic patient capital.
Contrary to expectations and in sharp contrast to their public hostility towards 'impatient' overseas private investors, an alliance between the political executive and managers in large industrial companies in both countries has not just welcomed but even actively sought to attract equity investments by SWFs. This alliance has overcome opposition or suspicion by other domestic insiders and policy makers. Its members have favoured SWF investments on the grounds of providing patient capital that is also 'passive'-ie not demanding 'voice' in company management, as well as offering other advantages such as exports. .We find that despite historic differences between the two countries, similar alliances welcomed SWF equity investment, suggesting that findings may apply more widely to different types of coordinated economy. Equally, although the desire for overseas state sources of patient capital was accentuated by the Great Recession, it began earlier and has continued even in a country that has largescale trade surpluses, suggesting that this is not just a temporary response to economic crisis.
Our overall argument is thus that, paradoxically, firms and policy makers in CMEs and
MMEs can use internationalisation and liberalisation to find new sources of patient capital from overseas state investors. Using our cases, we develop hypotheses concerning which actors form part of new coalitions that welcome overseas state investor and conditions under which they do so. In particular, we expect a coalition of industrial firms and the government to pursue overseas sources of capital when traditional domestic sources of patient capital decline and overseas investors are both patient and passive. In CMEs and MMEs, the coalition seeks to direct overseas state capital into specific firms, in contrast to LMEs, where policy makers and firms welcome foreign capital regardless of whether it is patient in order to maximise share prices and company valuations.
We thus seek to contribute to wider debates about whether internationalisation and liberalisation of markets necessarily run counter to the provision of patient capital. We bring in the state both as an investor and a domestic policy maker. We put forward arguments about the conditions and strategies that lead firms and policy makers in CMEs and MMEs to attract overseas state sources of capital which can be tested in other countries.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section discusses previous literature.
The second section then explains our choice of case and method. Thereafter we analyse German and French policy responses. The last section offers a wider discussion of the findings and hypotheses.
Previous literature on varieties of corporate governance, financial internationalisation and patient capital
Corporate governance systems are often classified into two categories, depending on the 'patience' of capital and the distance in relationships between key actors (see Jackson 2001 , McCahery et al. 2002 , Vitols 2004 ). Shareholder systems, of which the UK and US are the best examples, are characterised by 'impatient capital', notably that provided by shareholders.
These are often referred to as 'outsider' systems because shareholders exercise control by threatening to exit through withdrawing their capital. In contrast, in stakeholder systems, best exemplified by Germany, capital is more 'patient', being provided over the long term by banks and/or company cross-shareholdings. These are often called 'insider' systems because stakeholders-banks and cross shareholding companies as well as employees-can exercise 'voice' inside the system, instead of exit. In state-led or 'mixed market' economies, the state provides or coordinates the provision of capital (Schmidt 1996) . In most of the comparative political economy literature, financial markets such as equity markets, are seen as mainly offering impatient capital whereas patient capital is mainly supplied through 'relational banking' (Deeg and Hardie 2016) .
Financial internationalisation and liberalisation increase the scope for overseas provision of capital. But whereas 'outsider' systems such as those in the UK and US are seen to be relatively open to foreign investment because this does not undermine 'arms-length' relationships among actors, such investments may upset long-term relationships between key actors that were coordinating their actions in stakeholder or state-led systems in CMEs and MMEs. It runs counter to the provision of the long-term patient capital and conflicts with non-market coordination in other spheres of the economy. Moreover, insider systems have few outsiders, so that any outsiders are more likely to be foreign, raising issues of nationality (cf. Callaghan 2015) .
A major debate has arisen as to the effects of increased international capital mobility and the emergence of new types of investors on 'insider' systems. One view is that they undermine them by moving towards an 'outsider' model of governance characterised by 'impatient capital' and distant relationships between firm managers and suppliers of capital (Rajan and Zingales 2003, Gilson 2001) . But the contrary view suggests that pre-existing institutions and institutional complementarities either in corporate governance or in other spheres such as industrial relations, block or mediate exogenous pressures for an outsider model (Culpepper 2011 , Whitley 1999 .
In this article, we do not take a position in this general debate about the extent of change in corporate governance. Instead, we question whether financialisation and liberalisation only lead to the entry of overseas impatient capital or whether they can result in new, overseas sources of patient capital emerging. This responds to one of the central issues of the special issue-can financial markets provide patient capital? At present, studies have focused on private investors such as private equity firms or hedge funds or Anglo-American institutional investors (Goyer and Valdivielso 2014 , Goyer and Kwan Jung 2011 , O'Sullivan 2007 , Callaghan 2015 , Fioretos 2010 , Culpepper 2005 , Gospel, Pendleton, and Vitols 2014 , Goyer 2006 , Fichtner 2015 .
These studies share a number of limitations. First, they usually assume that all outsiders threaten or weaken existing institutional complementarities by being 'impatient' investors.
Yet the possibility that some overseas outsiders may offer patient capital and hence form part of strategies by existing insiders to maintain or adapt institutional complementarities should be considered. Second, the specification of the preferences and strategies of actors is rather categorical-corporate governance 'insiders' oppose the entry of outsiders while suppliers of 'patient capital' (banks or the state) supply it in return for 'voice'. Yet such preferences may differ in an internationalised financial system. Hence some 'insiders' may seek the entry of outsiders to adapt or support their position. Equally, patient capital suppliers may offer 'loyalty' but not seek to exercise 'voice' (cf Hirschman 1970) -for instance, because of lack of knowledge of the firm or confidence in the existing firm management. Third, while previous literature has paid attention to how the state reforms corporate governance regimes (Cioffi and Höpner 2006, Höpner 2007) , less attention has been paid to how the state reacts towards outsiders and especially to the role of the state as an international investor.
In this article we address these issues by exploring how different insiders and the state in insider systems of corporate governance react to foreign investments by a relatively new type of outsider, namely foreign state investors in the form of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). We focus on policy debates and decisions to ensure sufficient attention is given to the state as well as firms and labour. We examine perceptions of whether capital is patient or not, since our interest is in policies and strategies rather than economic outcomes. We define patient capital as being both long-term and unresponsive to short-term fluctuations in the profitability of the company in which capital is owned (cf. Deeg and Hardie 2016 1 ) . It protects managers against hostile takeovers and allows them to pursue long-term strategies. However, we note that such capital can be active (loyal and seeking voice) or passive (remaining loyal but not seeking 'voice' in the company's internal decisions). 
SWFs and the cases of Germany and France
SWFs are state-owned investment entities that buy overseas assets for investment purposes (IWG 2008) . 3 The term was coined in 2005 (Rozanov 2005 of CMEs and MMEs respectively that had domestic patient capital and were highly closed to overseas private investors. At the same time, the traditional sources of patient capital have differed somewhat between the two, with strong reliance on bank-based capital and a complex network of cross-shareholding to develop long-term industrial strategies in Germany (Höpner 2007 , Goyer 2011 , and a more direct role for the state in France in steering and financing by controlling significant shareholdings in key industrial conglomerates and providing credit (Zysman 1983) . But from the 1980s onwards the two countries introduced significant liberalisation of their financial markets, stock markets grew and foreign ownership also increased (van der Zwan 2014 : 115, Goyer 2006 , Fichtner 2015 and the nature of bank lending changed (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield. and Verdun 2013) . Hence we can study whether inherited different sources of capital in non-liberal market economies lead to diverse policies towards SWFs.
Our focus is on policy debates and decisions (legislation and strategies) towards SWFs as perceived new sources of patient capital. In addition to legislation, official reports, and indepth analysis of all articles mentioning SWFs in several major French and German newspapers, we collected data on SWF share investments using various established financial databases (see online appendix). We use both structured comparison and process tracing to explore how insiders respond to SWFs. The research design is inductive-generating hypotheses concerning the role of the state and strategies towards SWF investments as sources of capital that can be tested elsewhere.
German policies towards SWF equity investment

Internationalisation and the threat to patient capital and insider corporate governance
Traditionally in Germany, domestic banks provided 'patient capital' to industrial firms in a system of 'relational banking', alongside allied firms and families (Vitols 2004, Höpner and Krempel 2004) . The system was underpinned by a system of cross-shareholding: in 1999, cross-shareholding was around 37% in Germany compared to 1.2% in the UK (Callaghan 2015: 405) . Many firms had one major, stable shareholder-in the mid-1990s, the median size of the largest shareholding block was 57% in Germany compared to 9.9% in the UK and 5.4% in the New York Stock Exchange (Barca and Becht 2001: 19, suggests that more than half of them no longer have a German blockholder while foreign investors' holdings have risen.
Debates about foreign investment and SWFs
There was much debate in Germany about the maintenance of patient capital and foreign 14% of the company's equity 5 -had been controversial and several major companies reacted by introducing voting rights restrictions to protect themselves against investors from Gulf oil producing countries (Roth 1975 Similarly, Siemens contended that SWF investments helped protect the interests of long-term investors and strengthened the company's ability to protect itself against rivals. 14 Talking about an Abu Dhabi SWF, Matthias Mitscherlich, CEO of MAN-Ferrostaal, declared that "since our investor is not bound to quarterly reports they can view projects more long-term. This gives us a bit more freedom". 15 The combination of long-term investment horizon and loyalty was also put forward by SWF investors. For instance, the head of ADIA emphasised their "long-term investments" 16 and the head of the Qatari SWF also argued that they were "well-meaning long-term investors". 17 The two features were also apparent in the most prominent case of SWF investment, KIA's stake in Daimler. In 2014, the KIA Chairman said: "Over the past 40 years, KIA has been a shareholder in Daimler even during its difficult days as we never lost faith in the brilliance of our common company". 32 At the same time, SWFs did not demand 'voice' in terms of board seats. As Table 2 shows, SWFs had a (supervisory) board seat on only one of the companies in which they invested.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In sum, after the 2009 law, prominent German firms and senior politicians in the executive actively sought SWF investments. The strategy stands in sharp contrast to suspicion towards overseas private investors such as hedge funds, even from 'friendly' countries such as the US.
The surprising active promotion of SWFs investments despite previous opposition by members of parliament and trade unions, and to a lesser extent some banks, is best construed as the product of an alliance between the executive and large companies. This coalition has sought SWF investments because they saw them as loyal patient capital-stable, long-term investors who did not seek 'voice' in company management nor withdraw in difficult periods.
This started before the crisis of 2007/8 but the latter accentuated these trends.
Policies towards SWF equity investment in France
Internationalisation and the threat to insider corporate governance
In France, the state traditionally provided 'patient capital' through public ownership of major industries and banks, and by channelling credit to selected large companies and sectors, as part of wider industrial strategies (Hancké 2001 , Zysman 1983 ). In addition, family ownership remained strong. Foreign investments required government approval and French companies were largely closed to foreign equity. In addition, companies were often protected by cross-shareholdings-for instance, in 1999 cross-shareholding was around 20% in France compared to 1.2% in the UK (Callaghan 2015: 405) . In the mid-1990s, the median size of the largest shareholding block was 20% in France, much higher than in the UK (0.9%) and the New York Stock Exchange (5.4%) (Barca and Becht 2001: 19, Right (Deeg and Perez 2000, Schmidt 1996) . As a result, French companies' ownership structure evolved (Morin 2000) . 
Debates about foreign equity investment and legislative reform
In the late 1990s and 2000s debates emerged in France concerning additional regulatory restrictions on foreign equity investments. 33 according to which these funds should be welcomed. 35 Some members of parliament declared that "we need…to prevent SWFs from Qatar or Asia from buying our companies at demeaning prices". 36 As in Germany, some parts of the financial sector felt threatened by SWFs. For instance, Eric Pelletier, a private equity associate director, argued that the firepower of SWFs would allow them to "take positions in undervalued companies in stock markets" and "to attack when the time is right" resulting in "large-scale hostile operations". 37 Similarly, the chief economist of Crédit Agricole contended that French small and medium companies could be 'swallowed' by SWFs. 38 The comments suggest that the crisis increased opposition by financial actors concerned about foreign investors buying under-valued companies.
In contrast, large firms and the political executive were favourable to SWF equity investment. Margerie, argued that the presence of SWFs was a "financially valuable asset over the long run". 41 Another example is Arnaud Lagardère who headed a major media group. He argued that he was "favourable to SWFs because they are long-term investors" and was "satisfied with the presence of Qatar in the capital of Lagardère group". An analyst commenting QIA's investments pointed out that this was good news because they invest over the long-term and could help Lagardère. At the same time the deal was criticised by an American investor, Guy
Wyser-Pratte, who had failed to get a seat in Lagardère's supervisory board in 2010, and argued that the Qatari shareholders were "friends of Jean-Luc Lagardère and are trying to lock the capital in favour of the son". 42 The investment illustrates how SWFs can provide helpful protection for existing management, both through holdings and as part of wider supportive coalitions.
The case of the nuclear power firm Areva illustrates the importance of both patient and loyal SWF investments. Areva's management brought in KIA as an investor in 2010 and then started discussions with additional funds, including from China, 43 as profit margins eroded due to problems in its next generation of nuclear power stations and also when its then head, Anne Lauvergeon, was engaged in a fierce battle to keep the company's independence from EDF. The company welcomed KIA and declared that its stake would "enable the group to strengthen its equity and pursue its development plan with a reinforced capital structure".
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The deal was particularly attractive to the board because "KIA will not have a seat on the Areva supervisory board". 45 In contrast, Areva and Anne Lauvergeon strongly and successfully resisted a possible investment by the QIA, which was linked to her political enemies, notably President Sarkozy and the then head of EDF Henri Proglio. 46 The political executive was also very favourable to SWF investments and made an explicit distinction between different types of outsiders. For instance, French president Nicolas Sarkozy distinguished between those who invest "long-term" for a "financial return" and those who attempt to "destabilise companies and … steal their technologies". 47 In March 2008, French economics and finance minister Christine Lagarde commissioned a report "to analyse the new role of SWFs but also propose guidelines to define France's strategy towards SWFs". 48 The report called on France to develop investment projects that were likely to attract SWFs. 49 Crucially, it argued that no special rules for SWF investments were required and that the main question was how to attract SWF investments to France.
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Legislation and policies towards SWFs
Opposition to foreign investments in general led to several revisions to maintain national regulatory restrictions within the constraints of EU law. In the initial formulation of the Code Financier and monétaire, foreign investments could be blocked by the economics ministry where they might threaten public order, public authority and security or national defence or involved the weapons industry. Although the legislation contained considerable powers to restrict foreign equity investment, the extensions were driven by private foreign investment, not SWFs. In practice, the government has not blocked any investments by SWFs, including those from the Middle East and China which have bought stakes in important companies in major sectors such as communications, energy and even defence/aerospace. Total. Yet SWFs have rarely sought 'voice' through a seat on the management board-in only two of the examples of investments set out in Table 3 .
INSERT In sum, large companies and the political executive have increasingly used SWF investments to attract patient, loyal capital for major French firms, as well as accessing foreign markets and developing joint investment ventures. The pro-SWF stance contrasts markedly with these insiders' concerns about foreign private investors.
Conclusions and discussion
In both Germany and France, traditional forms of patient capital, notably block holdings and domestic state ownership, have declined from the 1990s onwards. Concomitantly, financial markets, including stock markets, have grown, internationalised and been liberalised. The traditional corporate governance model of long-term relationships between insiders based on patient capital would seem to be threatened.
Yet policy makers and the managers of prominent firms in both countries have welcomed non-Western SWF purchases of equity in major national companies. Indeed, they have gone further on many occasions by actively seeking such investment. Such policies are surprising,
given that SWFs are not just 'outsiders' but foreign outsiders from non-democratic countries. Our argument is that financial internationalisation and liberalisation can not only coexist with patient capital but indeed result in new foreign sources of such capital. We underline the growing role of overseas states as international investors and providers of patient capital.
SWFs themselves have expanded, now being larger than the hedge funds and private equity firms that have attracted so much academic and public attention, but other forms of international state investors also exist.
We argue that some existing insiders can adopt active strategies to adapt to financial changes and the decline of traditional sources of patient capital by actively seeking out overseas state patient capital. We posit the creation of new coalitions, notably between the managers of large strategic firms and the political executives which welcome and direct overseas state investors into specific sectors and firms. Far from being hostile to all overseas investors, certain traditional insiders find foreign investors to reconstitute their protective networks. The patience and loyalty of capital seem more important than its nationality. investors. The difficulty is that we have found almost no evidence of such SWF behaviour in Germany or France, so the examples would need to be taken from elsewhere. 67 But our analysis reveals that impatient private foreign investors were indeed much less welcomed.
Another test would be to study strategies and policies towards SWFs or other state investors in other CMEs and MMEs, either in Europe or elsewhere-for instance, in Japan. These could vary in some of the key explanatory factors for the welcome to SWFs identified in the two cases. Thus for instance, if a CME or MME had no decline in levels of domestically-provided patient capital, then much lower levels of welcome or indeed outright hostility to SWFs might be expected.
A third form of testing would be to distinguish CMEs and MMEs from LMEs. We would expect companies and policy makers to differ in terms of strategies and coalitions. In LMEs, they may well either view state investors with suspicion or else accept them as part of opening financial markets to all regardless of nationality rather than because of their ability to offer patient capital. Relationships with firm managers would also differ-with managers in
LMEs seeking SWFs as part of shareholder value strategies of pushing up share prices and indeed SWFs being sought even if they were 'impatient' investors. Equally, government-firm coalitions to direct overseas investments into particular firms, especially from the industrial sector, would not be expected in LMEs, but instead a general openness and attraction into all sectors, including the financial sector. Hence the specificities of CME and MME policies arising from the search for patient capital can be tested by looking at other types of market economy.
implications and hypotheses for broader debates about how internationalised and liberalised financial markets can provide patient capital. More generally, they point to the continuing role of the state-both as a supplier and as a policy maker-in ensuring the continued provision of patient capital.
